The design and development of future smart city services will usher with unprecedented creativity, a plethora of functionalities and conveniences to the urban communities. The success of smart city services depends on the assurance that security is maintained and protected to meet community expectations. However, due to the variety of components involved in the design of smart city services and their complex interactions, it becomes challenging to properly assess the overall security of the system throughout the service life cycle. This paper presents a holistic approach to model the security of smart city service infrastructure at a higher level of abstraction. To match realistic security deployments, the proposed model is based on multiple tiers of defense that includes defense at component level, system level, and security operation center. For a given system configuration and component vulnerability vector, the model assesses key security parameters for a variety of attacks. The proposed model is generic and can be used for studying the security of various smart city infrastructures, deployment configurations, and attack vectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Half of the global population lives in cities, and it is estimated that the world population will reach over eight and a half billion by 2030. Such an exponential growth in urban population puts tremendous pressure on city infrastructure and services. Smart City (SC) is an initiative that uses computing and communication technologies to offer a better quality of life for its citizens [1] . Smart cities are built using sophisticated sensing, actuating and networking technologies that are typically connected to a private cloud which hosts a variety of data management and analytical services on robust computing resources. Smart cities offer real-time monitoring and management of their infrastructure to provide integrated and insightful services for their citizens. With the help of sophisticated sensors, actuation, computation, communication, and management technologies smart cities can provide a variety of services such as smart traffic, waste, health, and street management. The global smart city market is increasing by many folds and is estimated to be over US$2.402 trillion by 2025 [2] .
However, the growth in high-tech SC services has created many avenues for cyber attacks. Researchers from IBM and The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mehedi Masud.
Threatcare discovered seventeen vulnerabilities in currently deployed SC systems that allow hackers to manipulate sensors' data [3] . Researchers from BGU found serious vulnerabilities in several commercial smart irrigation systems that can be used by attackers to cause significant damage to urban water services [4] . The consequence of cyber attacks has far more implications when it comes to SC systems as they can potentially affect millions of residents. For example, around 700,000 people were without electricity because of a cyber attack on Ukraine's power grid in 2015 [5] .
SC services use several hardware and software components including sensors, actuators, networking devices, communication protocols, middleware, and applications. Vulnerability in any of these components may allow hackers to attack the SC services. There is no way of eliminating or patching all vulnerabilities from these components because of several reasons such as those mentioned in [6] . Maintaining the security of SC services against cyber attacks is crucial, but it is getting increasingly difficult as the attacks are becoming more sophisticated. Further, new vulnerabilities are being discovered from time to time. This warrants a systematic approach that thoroughly checks all possible attack scenarios and measures the strength of deployed defense mechanisms.
The primary focus in the design of smart services in a SC is to look for a working solution rather than a secure solution. Further, due to the variety of components involved in the design of SC services and their complex interactions, it becomes challenging for the management and IT teams to properly assess the overall security of the system at the design stage. Security loopholes may creep in even after deploying a secure system because of new vulnerabilities in any of the components or a minor change in the existing configuration.
There are many existing research studies that analyze the detailed security aspects of a system at the sub-component level, such as the security breaches in communication protocol used by a sensor [7] . Although these results are of extreme importance, typically either they are not directly used by security administrators working in a facility such as a smart building or the security analysis does not consider non-technical aspects such as human factors which are crucial in this type of systems [8] . The proposed approach benefits from such analysis and facilitates a security admin to examine the overall system at a higher level. The proposed model is abstract in such a way that a security administrator does not need to look into the internal working of a component, but uses vulnerability scores to perform security analysis. In this manner, this approach makes it possible to examine the impact of security scores obtained from complex analysis at sub-component level on the security of overall systems consisting of a variety of components. Being able to assess the security of a cyber system by security teams at the design stage as well as after the deployment of the system is of great value for the proliferation of secure smart services.
This paper presents a holistic approach to model and study the security aspects of smart facilities (e.g. smart buildings, offices, and power plants) within a SC at a higher level of abstraction. Each facility may have a variety of components connected in various configurations. The paper proposes a multi-tier defense framework that models a secure system and captures attack-defense scenarios for generic types of attacks. Since any realistic security system consists of multiple layers of defense, a multi-tiered security system consisting of three layers is considered. The inherent security mechanism in any component of a SC represents the first tier of defense in the model. The second tier of defense is an independent system that monitors services and takes appropriate actions when needed. The third tier of defense is a security operation center (SOC) that consists of human-in-the-loop based system that analyzes activities across the system around the clock. SOC uses human expertise to defend against attacks that went undetected by the defense mechanisms, such as firewalls or intrusion prevention systems, at tier-2. The SOC team has security analysts (SAs) whose performance vary based on their current workload, proficiency and skill levels. The effect of these SA related human factors on the security of the system is also considered in the model.
The model is implemented using a well-known probabilistic model checker (PRISM) [9] . The system specifications are captured with the help of linear temporal logic (LTL). PRISM uses these specifications to verify whether the system meets the desired properties. In summary, the following are the key contributions of this paper:
• The model is kept generic to capture any existing or hypothetical future attack based on a complex combination of a variety of components used for a SC service. Further, the model is capable of handling various scenarios in multiple system configurations.
• The proposed model allows for calculating the risk of system failure for a variety of vulnerability vectors.
• The proposed approach abstracts away unnecessary security implementation details of individual components and focuses on risk analysis at the system level.
In particular, the risk analysis includes finding the probability of launching a successful attack, the associated cost of attack, and the effect of defense employed to mitigate the attack.
• The proposed system captures and assesses complex time-based system behavior due to rich temporal operators in LTL.
• The model includes a human-in-the-loop based defense layer that captures realistic factors influencing human performance, such as fatigue and workload.
• The efficacy of the proposed model is demonstrated through a case study that carries out a detailed analysis for a variety of system parameters. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the work related to SCs and their security. Section III explains briefly probabilistic model checking with an example. Section IV describes the details of the proposed approach along with attack-defense and SA models. Section V demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach with the help of a case study. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Remarkable benefits offered by the SCs and their economic impact on societies has recently grabbed the attention of governments and industries. US government organization NIST has taken several positive steps towards addressing numerous challenges (such as interoperability and cyber security) in realizing scalable and sustainable SC solutions. NIST's Global City Teams Challenge (GCTC) [10] is a program initiated to encourage collaboration and standards-based solutions for SC sector. This program has participation from over 150 cities and 400 companies/organizations. Another NIST project, the IoT-Enabled Smart City (IES-City) Framework Program [11] tried to converge several architectural design endeavors by creating an international technical working group. This group has developed a consensus framework called IES-City framework for SC architectures.
European standards organization, ETSI [12] also making similar efforts for globally acceptable standards for fully inter-operable SC solutions. OneM2M [13] is one of the global standard initiative, which covers different aspects of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) identified the intelligent transport systems (ITS) as a core component of SC and published guidelines and recommendations for ITS security [14] . These commendable efforts from international organizations are helping in interoperability and standardization of SC solutions, which is required for building security from the beginning [15] . Although there are several approaches proposed for IoT subsystems in the research literature, there is not much work that models a variety of cyber attacks in a generic framework. To the best of our knowledge, there are no proposals or approaches for modeling and evaluating the security of SC system at a higher level of abstraction.
A dense IoT model made up of an asynchronous communication network is proposed in [16] . The proposed model considers a Dolev-Yao adversary to study security and privacy problems in communication protocols. In particular, their adversary model captured corruption and fingerprinting abilities. The need for security model is emphasized in [17] , and brief security architecture for threat analysis is proposed. Authors modeled three key elements of IoT systems: computation (devices), communication, and control.
A graph theory based theoretical framework for modeling the security of IoT systems is proposed in [18] . This framework allows the estimation of parameters such as resiliency and scalability of heterogeneous IoT systems. Similarly, a threat model is proposed for three key use-cases of IoT systems: smart car, power management, and healthcare [19] . Three IoT applications, namely, body area, home, and hotel IoT are investigated in [20] . Authors designed a security framework called SecIoT that supports secure device authentication and user authorization, and provides risk notification.
A number of threat-mitigation approaches in the IoT that require minimal human intervention are surveyed in [21] . The authors classify autonomic security techniques into self-protecting, self-healing, and hybrid. Autonomic security implementation against various threats is elaborated for M2M, network, and cloud layers. Authors also suggest the need for a comprehensive autonomic security framework which provides defense against all key attacks including skimming, traffic analysis, replay, masquerading, and manin-the-middle.
Although the aforementioned approaches present a variety of theoretical frameworks for security modeling, they lack a comprehensive analysis of IoT security in terms of vulnerabilities in the individual components of the system. A formal graphical security model for IoT security analysis was proposed in [22] . The key objectives of this framework are to find all possible attack paths in the IoT, evaluate the risk level of the IoT systems using well-defined security parameters, and determine the efficacy of various defense schemes. The framework was assessed using different use-cases such as healthcare monitoring.
In [23] , the authors propose an approach for threat modeling and analysis of SC systems. Their evaluation procedure collects numerous features from various elements of SC services such as service architecture, database schema, data networks, operating systems, and security policies. Threat modeling is done based on the collected data and the related threat factors are calculated. Experienced human operator intervention is used for risk analysis and escalation. The study showed that this methodology can minimize the security risks of SC systems considerably.
A framework for risk analysis of IoT system using formal verification techniques is proposed in [6] . The approach takes vulnerability scores and different candidate IoT configurations as input and calculates the risk exposure probabilities. This framework is not sufficient for SCs because it doesn't take defense mechanisms into consideration for the risk analysis. Further, the attacker model proposed in this approach is simplistic (for example, it has a single cost for compromising any device) which is not suitable for SC consisting of a large network with a variety of devices.
SCs are going to usher, and the security attacks in their services are going to become more frequent and sophisticated. Thus, there are several research efforts that address SC security such as security surveys [24] , low cost prototype development for secure communications [25] and development of authentication protocols [26] . However, SC management needs to understand the implications associated with security attacks during the design, implementation and operational phases of SC services. A non-integrated component-wise framework is not sufficient to comprehend a broad range of security problems in an SC. A comprehensive approach can substantially reduce the risks of cyber attacks in SC systems [23] . The approach should consider defense at multiple layers when assessing system risk. This paper presents a comprehensive security model for assessing the security of SC services.
III. MODEL CHECKING PRELIMINARIES
Formal verification techniques have been widely used to verify system designs in a variety of domains. Model checking and theorem proving are well known formal verification techniques. Model checking has also been used as a validation technique in a variety of domains [27] , [28] . The proposed approach uses probabilistic model checking to validate the system properties.
In this section, the relevant background about the probabilistic model checking is discussed. It also briefly discusses about modeling systems with probabilistic and/or nondeterministic behavior. An example is used to elaborate on how a system can be modeled for analysis by a model checker.
A. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING
Probabilistic model checking (PMC) is a well-known method used for the formal verification of systems with probabilistic behavior. The basics of system modeling and the related background are briefly discussed in this subsection. For interested readers, [9] provides a detailed theoretical background as well as the implementation details in the model checker PRISM. VOLUME 7, 2019 1) LINEAR TEMPORAL LOGIC Temporal logics are widely used for many applications. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) captures the notion of time with the help of rich temporal operators such as ''next''( ) and ''until''(∪). Each operator is used to reason about states of the model where a system property needs to be checked. The following grammar captures the syntax of LTL formulas.
These operators can be used to define additional temporal operators such as ♦ for ''eventually'' and for ''always''. To understand the semantics of these operators, consider the tuple M = N, I , where I maps Natural numbers N to a set of propositions from 2 . An atomic proposition p ∈ is evaluated to be true at a point 'i': M , i | p if and only if p ∈ I (i). The following defines the semantics of each operator:
The above formulae imply that ψ is not satisfied in the model M at time i, the formula ψ 1 as well as ψ 2 are true in M at time i, the formula ψ is true in the model M at next epoch i + 1, and the formula ψ 1 remains true in the model M from time unit i to j−1 until the formula ψ 2 becomes true at time j.
2) MARKOV DECISION PROCESS
Markov decision process (MDP) provides a mathematical framework to model stochastic processes where the states of the system evolve probabilistically as well as nondeterministically. In a reactive system, if the states of the system evolve stochastically, state transitions are captured by some probability distribution. But when more than one action is available in a state (such as in the case of an unknown environment, concurrent events, or underspecified systems), a decision maker is needed to resolve nondeterminism among the set of available actions at that state. Formally, an MDP is described by a 4-tuple M = (S,s, A, δ) in which S represents a set of states,s ∈ S represents the initial state, A represents all available actions, and δ ⊆ S × A × Dist(S) represents a transition relation. Here all discrete probability distributions over S are captured by Dist(S). Let A(s) def = {a ∈ A|δ(s, a) is defined} be the set of available actions in a state s. To avoid deadlock, we assume that A(s) is non-empty for all s ∈ S. That is, at least one action is always available in every state.
3) DISCRETE TIME MARKOV CHAIN
When a state transition system evolves, it results in several possible paths. Each path is a sequence of states which could be finite or infinite. The nondeterminism present in an MDP needs to be resolved in order to formally reason about probability space over infinite paths. That is, we need a strategy σ that tells us what action to take from the set of available actions A(s) in each state s. When a strategy σ is applied, the resulting MDP becomes probabilistic and thus can be captured by discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) denoted by M σ . The induced M σ starts withs and has an infinite number of states.
Now we can reason about the behavior of induced DTMC by calculating the probability that certain paths are taken. The probabilities of the sets of infinite paths are defined using the concept of cylinder sets. In particular, for each finite path ρ ∈ FPath, the Cylinder C ρ is the set of all infinite paths starting with ρ. Probability measure of a cylinder can now be defined for a given finite path ρ = s 0
. For a given MDP M where nondeterminism is resolved via a strategy σ , Pr σ s represents probability measure over all infinite paths starting at state s of the induced DTMC M σ . Finally, if φ represents system specifications of a particular system M , then M σ | φ represents that the model M satisfies system specification φ under strategy σ .
4) THE PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKER (PRISM)
PRISM is one of the widely used probabilistic model checker that has been successfully applied to model and assess various reactive systems that exhibit random as well as nondeterministic behavior [29] . A variety of systems have been analyzed with the help of PRISM such as security protocols, randomized distributed algorithms, network protocols, and transportation systems [30] - [33] . A system can be broken into modules that interact with each other thereby resulting in system evolution. PRISM provides a simple language that is used to capture each module of the system. PRISM tool also provides property specification language to capture temporal logic based formulas. State or transition rewards can also be captured with the help of reward structures. Once the model of a system is developed and the corresponding system specifications are written, the reward structures can be used to analyze the system against given specifications.
B. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
We take the example from [34] to demonstrate how MDP can be used to model a system that performs a task via safe or risky procedures. The MDP is shown in Figure 1 . Here, M = (Q,q, A, δ), Q = {q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 },q = q 0 , and FIGURE 1. An example MDP showing the model of a system which executes a task using safe or risky procedure. A = {go, safe, risk, finish, reset, stop}. Probabilistic transitions are given below.
The system, after some routine initialization, moves from state q 0 to q 1 with probability 1. At q 1 , the system can perform the task using either safe or a risky procedure. If safe procedure is chosen, then the system can finish the task with probability 0.3 or restarts with probability 0.7. If risky procedure is followed, then the system finishes the task (state q 2 ) or results into complete failure (state q 3 ) with equal probability of 0.5. The action reset restarts the system in case of failure and brings it back to the starting state q 0 . In this MDP,
In order to break nondeterminism, we may enforce a strategy σ . For instance, one example strategy is to always enforce safe action at state q 1 , thereby moving to state q 0 or q 2 . This will result in induced DTMC M σ as described earlier in this section.
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
This section elaborates the proposed approach to model the security in SC services. The model comprises of three tiers of defense to capture SC security for a variety of realistic system implementations. The model is independent of individual defense mechanisms used at each tier, and any type of existing security mechanisms and services can be employed to thwart security attacks. The first tier of defense is component-level security such as authentication, encryption, etc. Defense at this tier becomes weak when there are vulnerabilities at the component-level. In addition to the defense present at the first tier, there are independent defense mechanisms that monitor the services and take appropriate actions at the second defense tier. Examples of defense at second tier could be an anti-malware software that detects suspicious code and blocks it, firewalls which monitor network traffic and block suspicious activities, or an intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) which monitors the anomalies in the system.
The third tier of defense is based on a security operations center (SOC) which analyzes activities across the system around the clock. The third tier is essential in the SC security as advances in the attack tools and techniques are continuously changing the threat landscape where some attacks sneak through the installed defenses. The SOC collects real-time activity data from all endpoints, controllers, and network to diffuse these attacks. An expert and vigilant SOC team leverages advanced data analytics, machine learning and visualization techniques to identify and respond to these attacks. Cyber-security analysts (SAs) rapidly respond to the identified threats by proactive measures, which significantly reduce the system/service compromise. For example, an attack at a higher level such as SC transport services could be discovered weeks in advance if intermediate attacks (e.g., computer infection and network scanning for critical components) were identified earlier by SAs [35] .
The threat detection process is a knowledge-intensive task in which an SA's expertise is leveraged to quickly eliminate false alerts and escalate the real alerts for further analysis and appropriate response [36] . Domain and situational knowledge of SA plays a critical role in the decision process. Further, SA's ability to relate different events and act in a timely manner affects the response value [37] . Another factor that affects the response is SA's workload [38] . The defense model at the third tier incorporates the necessary parameters that influence the performance of a security analyst.
The proposed model aids in two ways. It helps in designing an SC security setup with existing vulnerability scores. It also helps existing SC security setup to recalculate their risks when new vulnerabilities are found. This allows management to make decisions about the cost-effective countermeasures to minimize the risk.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The proposed model for smart cities consists of an adversary that is trying to attack a system where there are different types of attacks that can be launched on the system. The system consist of a variety of components where only a subset of all the components are directly or indirectly involved in all cyber attacks. The system is represented as the tuple Sys = D, T , A, SA where D = {d 1 , d 2 , · · · d n } is the set of components in the system, T = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · t k } represents the type of each component such as sensor, actuator, link, etcetera. A function type : D → T returns the type of each component. A = {a 1 , a 2 , · · · a m } is the set of cyber-attacks under consideration by an attacker such that ∀a i ∈ A, D i ⊆ D is a set of components where d j ∈ D i is vulnerable to a i and a i ∈A D i ⊆ D. Corresponding to each attack a i ∈ A and the relevant component d j ∈ D i vulnerable to a i , there is a tuple p ij = p ij a , p ij d that captures the probability of attack and defense being successful at tier-1 and tier-2 respectively. A matrix P[m × n] captures all such tuples with each row 1 ≤ i ≤ m for a i ∈ A and column 1 ≤ j ≤ n for d j ∈ D such that ∀i P[i, j] = 0, 1 when d j / ∈ D i . Depending on the adversary's objective, there could be multiple methods to achieve it. Each method involves compromising a set of components. The attacker chooses an attack and the corresponding component to launch the attack. After an attack is successful with probability p ij a , the system's first line of defense automatically responds to it with the following probabilities:
In the case of failure, the attacker resorts to attacking another component from D i and keeps on attacking the system until the attack objective is met. However, if the attacker becomes successful in launching an attack at the first level, the system's second line of defense comes into action and tries to thwart the attack with a probability of p ij d .
The attack on a particular device j is considered successful if the component fails to defend itself with probability (1 − p ij d ). In this case, the device is labeled as compromised and the attacker may need to continue the attack on other relevant components until the desired attack objective is achieved. Conversely, if the second line of defense succeeds (with probability p ij d ) in thwarting an attack then the system generates an alert which triggers the attention of SA in the final line of defense. The SA examines the system for possible actions that may need increasing the security of the system by taking a variety of measures depending upon the environment and the type of attack. It results in increased defense level of the system by a factor f def (< 1) upto a maximum value L def .
The SOC operates in parallel, where SA continuously monitors system logs using various advanced data analytics and visualization techniques to identify potential threats. SA rapidly responds to the identified threats by proactive measures, which significantly reduce the system compromise as follows:
The threat detection process is a knowledge-intensive activity in which an analyst's expertise and knowledge (domain and situational) play a significant role in threat analysis and taking an appropriate response [36] . So, the SA model takes various aspects into consideration such as skills, workload, and fatigue. We leverage such human-in-the-loop based human model from [8] where the human model is a tuple SA = w, f p , f d , F th, , p w (f p ) that considers two workload conditions w ∈ {low, high}. Under low workload condition, the effectiveness of the defense strategy taken by an SA has a higher chance of success than that under high workload condition. Moreover, the analyst gets fatigued whenever he/she is involved in decision making. Fatigue is modeled as an integer value that keeps on increasing with every SA's involvement. After a certain threshold F th , the effectiveness of the SA's decision is discounted by a discount factor f d . Whether the performance of the SA is discounted or not, the measures taken by the SA to thwart the upcoming attack on the system results into increased attack cost with probability p low or p high corresponding to the workload level. The SA with low workload examines the system with probabilities p low (f p ) and 
That is, after a certain threshold, SA's accuracy is discounted by a factor f d (f d < 1) . The fatigue discount factor of the SA also depends on the type of the component that in under attack as critical components demands increased focus resulting in improved SA's performance. SA's accuracy at high workload p high (f p ) and 1 − p high (f p ) is defined in the similar way. Given the workload condition w ∈ {low, high}, defense at tier-3 can be given as:
Corresponding to each type of attack and the related components, there is cost c ij associated to each attempt of the attack. Attacker's cost can be given as:
where n ij is the number of attack attempts on device d j for attack a i . The attacker stops if any of the following conditions hold: 1) A particular attack is successful and the system is compromised against that attack. 2) Attacker tries a variety of attacks until it exhausts its resources: C a ≥ T cost . Here T cost is the maximum threshold value for the attacker's cost. 3) Attacker runs out of time for time-bound attacks. Given a set of attacks A and a function ∀i ∈ A, dev(i) = D i that returns the set of devices corresponding to each type of attack, the system is said to be compromised if the following formula is true:
such that ∀a i ∈ A, k = |D i | and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · k} ψ j is true when d j ∈ D i is compromised with probability (1 − p ij d ). Here • ∈ {∨, ∧} is conjunction or disjunction operator and is chosen such that φ i becomes true. Equation 9 can be used to capture compound attacks as well where a combination of different attacks occur as given below.
where ζ i is true when a i is successful. If an attacker is not able to compromise the system with any chosen attack, it may still launch an attack on randomly chosen components D r ⊆ D, |D r | = N comp . Given a set of attacks A (|A| = m) and the corresponding components D i vulnerable to each a i ∈ A, the total number of components potentially vulnerable to A can be found using inclusion-exclusion principle as follows:
Eq. 11 assumes that some components are potentially vulnerable to more than one type of attack, that is, for any two attacks a i and a j , D i and D j are not necessarily disjoint. Therefore, one must count each d k ∈ D i only once in the equation for N vul . The system may be considered compromised with the following malicious component ratio:
The random attack is considered successful when malicious component ratio meets a certain threshold.
B. ATTACK-DEFENSE (AD) AND SA MODELS
Due to the non-deterministic choices inherent in the attacker's set of actions, the attack-defense mechanism is modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Figure 2 depicts the MDP corresponding to the attack-defense model of the system. The model begins by the attacker choosing non-deterministically a particular type of attack i from the list of attacks A. This takes the system to the next state where the attacker chooses a device d ij ∈ D i which is also modeled non-deterministically in the MDP. The attacker compromises the device successfully with probability p ij a and moves to the next state where the second line of defense activates and thwarts the attack with probability p ij d . If the third line of defense fails to protect the device, the device's status is changed to compromised. On the other hand, an alert is generated and the SA module examines the system as shown in Fig. 3 . Due to the stochastic nature of the SA's set of actions, it has been modeled as a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC). Based on the workload and fatigue conditions, the DTMC of the SA probabilistically ref. Table 1 6:
while true do Continuously run for all epochs 7: select i ∈ A non-deterministic selection 8:
non-deterministic selection 10: n ij ← n ij + 1 11: select state ← 1 with prob. p ij a 12: 13: if state = 2 then go to 8 14: alert ← true with prob. p ij d 15: if (state = 1) then 8: if f p ≤ F th then 9: if alert = false then 10: state ← 3, f p ++ with prob. p high1 11:
else 13: state ← 3, f p ++ with prob. p high2
14:
← 4, f p ++ with prob. (1 − p high2 ) 15: else 16: if alert = false then 17: state ← 3 with prob. p high1 · f d 18:
else 20: state ← 3 with prob. p high2 · f d 21: 22: if (state = 2) then 23: if f ≤ F th then 24: if alert = false then 25: state ← 3, f p ++ with prob. p low1 26:
else 28: state ← 3, f p ++ with prob. p low2
29:
← 4, f p ++ with prob. (1 − p low2 ) 30: else 31: if alert = false then 32: state ← 3 with prob. p low1 · f d 33:
else 35: state ← 3 with prob. p low2 · f d 36:
← 4 with prob. (1 − p low2 · f d ) 37: sync action [Update] 38: state ← 0 C. MODEL PARAMETERS VALUES The above proposed system and attack-defense models are kept generic to assess the security of any system against a variety of known and potential future attacks for a given system configuration and vulnerability vector. The vulnerability data and exploitation probabilities can be obtained from well-known vulnerability databases such as National Vulnerability Database (NVD), and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The configuration of smart facilities/services are provided by the security designer, and the security team creates an attack vector for known set of attacks as well as for hypothetical future attacks.
These databases have been heavily used by researchers in a variety of domains to assess their work [39] - [44] . CVSS is a standard measurement system for industries, organizations, and governments that need accurate and consistent scores [45] , [46] . A security administrator can leverage these scores and use our model to perform security analysis for a variety of input configurations. The results obtained from the proposed model are reliable and serve as a guiding point for the security designer. For example, if a new vulnerability is found in a component, the proposed model can be used to assess its impact on the overall system in a particular configuration. A security admin may then modify the existing configuration to reduce/eliminate the effect of newly found vulnerability.
V. SC CASE STUDY
Smart cities have many physical facilities, such as government offices, finance centers, and research centers, where security is of prime importance. This section demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach and performs risk analysis for the security of SC critical facilities. The considered attack scenarios are based on commonly studied attacks in the research literature [6] , [47] . Further, more interesting attacks such as blind and persistent attacks are also considered. Although, the chosen attack scenarios are for one possible configuration, the proposed approach is capable of handling a variety of scenarios composed of any configuration and set of attacks. For instance, if an attack is considered successful in a given configuration, an administrator may choose to increase the security by changing the configuration (e.g. add a redundant link between two components). The proposed model can then be used to assess the security of this new configuration. The set of attacks and the corresponding scenarios evolve over time and our model is capable of performing the security analysis of known and any hypothetical future configurations and attacks.
Consider a typical SC which has a SOC to monitor all the prime facilities. SC management has identified two categories of threats: (a) unauthorized entry into the premises (physical intrusion), which could lead to several other attacks such as theft and sabotage (b) Remote unauthorized interference with the infrastructure, which includes manipulation of sensor data, unwarranted actuation, and disruption of network communication between different service components.
For this case study, consider a facility that has a primary entrance, which is controlled by an actuator (A door ) to open/close and a sensor (S door ) to monitor its status. The facility entrance also opens automatically whenever there is an emergency for a quick and safe evacuation. The emergency situation depends on the type of facility. For instance, it could be fire, radiation, chemical release, etc. Emergency events are monitored by emergency sensors (S emer ) and alarm actuators (A alarm ). The end devices (sensors and actuators) are connected to a gateway (GW) via wireless connections. The GW connects to a controller and a private cloud through a router. Cloud enables interaction with SC emergency services. Figure 4 shows one possible configuration of the security system.
The components of the security system may have several vulnerabilities resulting in various types of threats [6] , [21] . For example, (a) Wireless links (L 1 to L 4 ) are susceptible to jamming or collision attacks which may result in missed alarms and/or repudiated actuation, (b) Zigbee implementation of communication protocol in GW can be compromised to modify traffic and trigger actuators, (c) Authentication mechanism of sensors can be compromised to impersonate sensors and send false sensor alerts to the gateway, (d) Authentication mechanism of actuators can be compromised to impersonate gateway and send false actuation commands.
Based on the aforementioned possible vulnerabilities, the following attacks are considered in this case study for the configuration given in Fig. 4 :
1) Unauthorized entry or Physical Intrusion (PI ): This
attack could be carried out in two ways. One way is to compromise A door by sending an unauthorized actuation command to open the door. This can be done by compromising the authentication mechanism of A door , which allows masquerading of commands as if they are coming from GW. Similarly, PI can be achieved via manipulating the packet data by compromising the integrity of the protocol data or by replaying the old valid data. Further, to avoid alerts from S door the link (L 2 ) needs to be jammed briefly until the door is closed.
In case A door could not be compromised, the attacker can generate a fake emergency alert from S emer . This can be done by either replaying old data or by flipping the bits in the latest message from S emer to GW. Then GW will take action by actuating A door and A alarm , and sending alerts to emergency services. Therefore, the intruder must block links L 4 and L 5 to avoid these alerts. PI attack can be expressed as:
2) Generating a false alarm (False Positive, FP): Here the attacker simply wants to create chaos with false alarms. For this purpose, the attacker just needs to replay an old message or flip the bits in the latest message sent by the sensors S emer or S door . For simplicity, we are eliminating any scope of manipulating GW directly. FP attack can be expressed as: FP = C S emer ∨ C S door . 3) Jamming Communication Channel (MA): For this attack, the attacker wants to interfere during a real emergency situation by suppressing the commands sent to A door and A alarm . This can be achieved by jamming links L 3 , L 4 and/or L 5 depending on the severity of the attack. Blocking commands on one link is sufficient to create chaos in the system, but complete suppression of alert/actuation commands could induce a maximum loss. These two cases are considered separately as MA low and MA high which can be expressed as:
Blind attack (BA): When an attacker does not possess enough information about the type of attack or the components related to a particular attack, the attacker may choose to undermine the system security as best as possible by launching a blind attack on randomly selected components to sabotage any part of the system. attack can be expressed as: BA = ∀d j ∈ D i ,
where D i ∈ P(D)\∅ and P(D) represents the power set of D. System security against these attacks can be analyzed using several parameters including the following: probability of attack (p a ), tier-2 defense (p d ), tier-3 type of the SA (novice, expert, average), workload level of SA, attack type (PI , FP, MA low , MA high , or BA), and attacker resources (such as maximum available time and attack cost).
The attack-defense and SA models given in Algorithm 1 and 2 are implemented using a prominent probabilistic model checker PRISM. Values of the parameters used in this case study are given in Table 1 . The values of these parameters can be obtained from the existing system implementations. For example, the system behavior patterns from system logs can be used to extract these values. However, when these security metrics cannot be obtained directly from real-world scenarios, a value range can be used. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) uses a similar way to assess the severity of vulnerabilities [22] . Further, it is assumed that all components possess similar anomaly detection ability at tier-2. Other researchers have made similar assumptions such as [48] .
Once the model is implemented in PRISM, system specifications can be expressed in LTL and verified against the model. The following are a few example LTL formula that can be used to assess several system properties: 
5) Find the number of failed attempts within given time constraints: R{''failed_attempts''}max=? [C<=Time]
Where failed_attempts is defined as a PRISM variable that gets incremented by 1 whenever an attack is launched, but foiled at any defense layer.
A. PERSISTENT ATTACKS SC security management team is often interested in estimating the possibility of attack (risk) and the associated attack overhead (cost) when a persistent attacker has unlimited time. This estimation needs to be done for each attack after appropriate defense measures are taken. To establish on analysis baseline, average probabilities are considered under normal circumstances. The probability of compromising a component in the system by exploiting the vulnerabilities at tier-1 (p ij a ) and the probability of successfully detecting of attack at tier-2 (p ij d ) are taken to be 0.5. Further, it is assumed that the SA under normal workload condition is monitoring the system at tier-3.
Using the aforementioned parameters, the proposed model can be used to calculate the risk and attack overhead for different types of attacks with the results plotted in Figs. 5 and 6. It can be seen from the figures: (a) when attack needs compromising only one component from the available set of components, then it has a higher chance of success. For this reason, FP and MA low have a very high risk. Conversely, MA high has a lower risk because an attacker needs to suppress all alerts. This is a difficult task since it requires compromising several components and suppression of all alerts may generate additional alerts from tier-2 defense; (b) PI attack also involves compromising more than one component, but there are different ways of doing the attack. So, it has average risk and attack overhead; (c) when an attacker has no information about the system, as the case of BA, the attack overhead is very high and the probability of success is very low; (d) after a certain time threshold, the probability of successful PI , MA high and BA becomes constant and cannot be increased no matter how long an attacker tries. These attacks require multiple attempts which results in activation of appropriate countermeasures as described in Eqs. 2 and 3, and hence the attack success probability becomes constant.
In order to see an attacker with better attack capabilities, Fig. 7 plots the probability of attack success for an advanced persistent attacker (that is, tier-1 defense can be compromised with p a = 0.95, and tier-2 and tier-3 parameters are unchanged). It can be seen from the figure that increasing the value of p a does not increase the probability of successful attack in the long run. It is only that the attacker is able to exploit the system faster than before.
Depending upon a variety of input parameters, such plots provide valuable insights that can be used to design better security systems. For instance, Fig. 5 shows that given the time constraint of 50 units and average attack/defense probabilities, the probability of BA is less than 1%, whereas, MA low has a success probability of more than 90% even when an attacker has stringent time requirements (40 time units).
B. INFLUENCE OF DEFENSE TIERS
The SC security management team is interested in knowing the influence of different tiers in mitigating the attacks. The proposed model can be used to calculate the risk, attack overhead, and the percentage of foiled attempts associated with each attack type for different defense tiers. For this purpose, three distinct cases are considered: T1 (tier 1 only), T2 (automated tier 2 defense with p ij d = 0.5), and T3 (an average SOC analyst). The estimated attack risks with each additional tier of defense for aforementioned five attack types are presented in Fig. 8 . It is evident that each additional layer of defense significantly reduces the risk, especially for PI, MA high and BA attacks. T2 has reduced the risk by 0.48, 0.19, 0.14, 0.61, and 0.02 respectively for PI, FA, MA low , MA high and BA attacks. Similarly, inclusion of T3 with an average operator has reduced the risk by 0.65, 0.21, 0.17, 0.71, and 0.02 respectively for PI, FA, MA low , MA high and BA attacks. These results show the importance of an automated IDPS at tier 2 in minimizing the risk.
The influence of tier 3 may not be very significant from Fig. 8 alone, especially for FA and MA low . However, it is evident when the other parameters such as ''number of foiled attempts'' and ''attack overhead'' are measured. The proposed model is used to measure these parameters as well. Figs. 9 and 10 display the percentage of foiled attempts and the attack overhead respectively at different tiers for various attack types. Inclusion of tier 2 and SA at tier 3 has increased the percentage of foiled attacks by 18% and 29% for PI, 22% and 31% for FP, 29% and 43% for MA low , 18% and 27% for MA high , and 17% and 25% for BA.
It is interesting to know whether the tiers offer any benefit when a zero-day vulnerability is discovered and the tier 1 defense can be compromised. In order to examine this scenario and calculate the associated risk, the number of foiled attempts, and attack overhead, the probability of attack being successful is increased to 0.8. The obtained results are added to the same Figs. 8, 9 and 10. As anticipated the probability of successful attack with only tier-1 defense has increased considerably and it is 100% for all attack types except BA. However, the inclusion of tier-2 and tier-3 defense layers reduce the probability of attack being successful with the increase in associated attack cost. They have reduced the risk and increased the cost for all types of attacks. For example, in the case of PI, the risk is reduced from 100% to 36%. Further, the number of failed attempts are increased by at least 39%. In other words, the stronger tier 2 and tier 3 defense layers are essential to handle unforeseen attacks.
C. WORKLOAD INFLUENCE ON SECURITY ANALYST
Although the benefits of tier 3 are evident from the previous analysis, the results obtained depend upon the performance of SA. Various factors, such as the skill level of SA, fatigue threshold, current workload conditions, etcetera, play a vital role in assessing the influence of tier 3. For this purpose, three SA types (novice, average, and expert) are considered. The parameters related to each SA type are given in Table 1 . Fig. 11 shows the percentage of foiled attacks for different attack types. Regardless of the attack type, SA skills help positively in elevating the defense. A skilled SA thwarts more attacks and hence reduces the risk of attack and increases attack cost.
In addition to SA's inherent abilities, SA's performance is also affected by external workload. Fig. 12 plots the risk for three different workloads (low, medium, and high) under two SA skill levels for two types of attacks. Under heavy work- load, even an expert SA may perform similar to an average SA under low workload condition. This doesn't undermine the importance of expert SAs but shows the influence of workload on SA's performance. Under heavy workload, it is better to have a higher number of average SAs than few expert SAs.
D. FURTHER EXAMPLES
As demonstrated in the previous subsections, a security designer is able to examine key parameters in the design of SC infrastructure with the help of the proposed framework. Further, the security of the SC services can be reassessed in case of any changes in the system after the deployment. The proposed approach allows a designer to estimate risk and answer a broad range of security questions. The following are a few examples (non-exhaustive) to demonstrate the versatility of the proposed approach.
• New attack: Define any new attack (hypothetical or real) and estimate the related parameters such as risk and overhead cost for a wide variety of configurations. For instance, attack H is possible when either S door , A door and link L 2 or links L 3 , L 4 and L 5 are compromised, along with S emer and links L 2 or L 2 are compromised. This hypothetical attack can be expressed as: 
• New vulnerability: Estimate the risk of overall service compromise when one particular component is found to have a new vulnerability. For example, A door has a new vulnerability that makes a masquerading attack very easy.
• New defense mechanism or design: Measure effectiveness of new defense mechanisms on overall security. For example, an update in IDPS can detect masquerading attempts on A alarm and A door effectively.
• Attacker's constraints: Estimate the critical parameters for an attack due to the attacker's resource limitations such as available time. For example, the attacker's overhead to accomplish MA high within 100 time-units.
A few example risk, cost, and time estimates for the above design questions are shown in Table 2 . With the help of the proposed framework, a general query can be made or critical parameters can be estimated for a specific set of input parameters. For example, the probability of aforementioned hypothetical attack (P H ) can be restricted to less than 6% with a minimal defense and an expert SA. Similarly, specific queries can be generated and numerous insights can be obtained from the model. In general, the proposed model allows security designers to study complex sets of security metrics, system configurations, threat vectors and understand their impact on the overall security without actually implementing any changes in the physical system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The notion of IoT-based smart cities has gathered momentum in the past few years. However, the security concerns of smart city services may impede the market surge. Current research efforts have taken hyper-focused approaches in addressing security issues. Such discrete solutions are not sufficient to address the ever converging cyber threats in smart cities. There is a need for a comprehensive approach towards modeling SC security which can be used by the SC management team to assess the risk. This paper proposes a multi-tier defense framework that models the security of smart city service infrastructure at a higher level of abstraction. The framework includes component and system-level defenses, and a SOC operator where analysts' domain and situational knowledge play a critical role in identifying threats. The proposed model allows for calculating the risk of existing attacks as well as hypothetical future attacks.
The versatility of the proposed model is demonstrated with the help of a case study and several examples. Useful insights are obtained via a detailed analysis of various security parameters. Such deep understanding and insights serve as a guiding point for the security designer. As part of future work, the model will be applied to assess the security of several SC facilities and services such as power plants, intelligent transport systems, and smart healthcare systems. Further, consolidated risk analysis of distributed city-wide facilities will be studied to assess resilience in case of coordinated attacks.
